Abstract. A modified realisability interpretation of infinitary logic is formalised and proved sound in constructive type theory (CTT). The logic considered subsumes first order logic. The interpretation makes it possible to extract programs with simplified types and to incorporate and reason about them in CTT.
Modified realisability
Modified realisability interpretation is a well-known method for giving constructive interpretation of some intuitionistic logical system into a simple type structure [Tro73] . The method is used, for instance, in Minlog and Coq for extracting programs from proofs (cf. [Sch04] and [Let04] ). These programs are to a large extent free from the computationally irrelevant parts that might be present in programs arising from direct interpretations into constructive type theory. The realisability interpretation requires a separate proof of correctness, which is usually left unformalised.
In this note we present a completely formalised modified realisability interpretation carried out in the proof support system Agda [Coq00] . We shall here use what is called modified realisability with truth which has the property that anything realised is also true in the system (Theorem 1.2). One difference from usual interpretations as in Minlog is that the logic interpreted goes beyond first order logic: it is a (constructively) infinitary logic, which arises naturally from the type-theoretic notion of universe. Our extension to infinitary logic seems to be a novel result.
Agda is based on Martin-Löf constructive type theory [ML98] with an infinite hierarchy of universes #0 = Set, #1 = Type, #2 = Kind, #3, . . . . Each of these universes is closed under the formation of generalised inductive data types. We define in Agda an inductive type SP of propositions, so called simple propositions, by induction: for each small type A (i.e. a member of Set) an atomic proposition atom(A) : SP is introduced; SP contains ⊥ and is closed under propositional connectives (∧, ∨, →) and for any small type A and any propositional function P : A → SP the quantified propositions ∀(A, P ) and ∃(A, P ) belong to SP. There is an obvious homomorphic embedding Tp of SP into the small types defined by Tp(⊥) = ∅, Tp(atom(A)) = A, Tp(P ∨ Q) = Tp(P ) + Tp(Q), Tp(P ∧ Q) = Tp(P ) × Tp(Q), Tp(P → Q) = Tp(P ) → Tp(Q), Tp(∀(A, P )) = (Πx : A)Tp(P (x)) and Tp(∃(A, P )) = (Σx : A)Tp(P (x)). We shall sometimes write (∀x : A)P (x) for ∀(A, P ) etc.
The simple propositions may be realised by terms from a simplified type structure. All atomic propositions will be realised by the unique element elt of the unit type Un. Define another homomorphism Cr (for crude type) from SP to small types by letting
The only difference from Tp is thus in the translation of absurdity and atoms. We note that a crude type may still be a dependent type, if the simple proposition is truly infinitary. For example, this is the case with Cr(∃(A, P )), if A = N and
Another variant of the crude type map Cr ′ will be employed in Theorem 1.7 below, which is defined as Cr, except that
The unit type appearing in the disjoint sum ensures that the type is never empty, which is crucial for interpreting the full absurdity axiom. The modified realisability MR(S, r) of a simple proposition S : SP by an element of crude type r : Cr(S) is defined as a small proposition (or small type) by the following recursion on S. (We use the identification of propositions and types for small types, so that ∧ and ∨ are used interchangeably with × and +, respectively.)
Here r.1 and r.2 denote the first and second projections.
Remark 1.1. The above constructions work in many different type-theoretic settings.
What is needed is a type universe U closed under Π, Σ, + and containing basic types Un and ∅. Moreover the inductive construction SP U is should be made relative to U instead of Set. Then Tp U : SP U → U Cr U : SP U → U are defined by recursion on SP U similarly to the above, and so is
The following correctness, or conservativity, result states that each simple proposition, which is realised, is also true in the standard interpretation. Proof. The proof goes by induction on S. For S = ⊥ or S = atom(A) the result is immediate. For S = A → B we took care to define realisability so that this is direct as well. Here are two examples of the inductive step.
Suppose MR(A∨B, r). If r = inl(s), then MR(A, s) is true. By the inductive hypothesis, we get Tp(A) and hence also Tp(A ∨ B). The argument for r = inr(t) is similar.
Assume MR(∀(A, P ), r). Let a ∈ A. Then MR(P (a), r(a)), and so by the inductive hypothesis Tp(P (a)). Since a was arbitrary we have actually Tp(∀(A, P )).
As a corollary there is an extraction theorem for ∀∃-formulae: Corollary 1.3. For small types A and B and a simple proposition P (x, y) where x : A and y : B, let S = (∀x : A)(∃y : B)P (x, y). If MR(S, r) for some r, then there is some f : A → B such that Tp(P (x, f (x))) for all x : A.
Thereby the program f extracted also satisfies its specification Tp(P (x, f (x))) within type theory. For P (x, y) = atom(R(x, y)) this is equivalent to R(x, f (x)). Remark 1.4. Note the difference in the ∀-case from usual interpretations, which go from theories to theories [Tro73] . It is not required that Tp(Π(A, P )) is added to the condition, since this follows from the correctness theorem in the present internalised version.
We present an intuitionistic infinitary propositional logic IP C − ∞ in type theory in which quantifiers are understood as infinitary versions of conjunction and disjunction. The system has a restriction on the absurdity axiom to atomic formulae.
Remark 1.5. Note in particular that the existential quantifier is of the weak kind, as in first order logic. For S = ∅ each ∃(S, P ) works as absurdity constant. However, if we wish to avoid empty sets as types of realisers, the restricted absurdity axiom ⊥ ⊢ atom(P) should be used. The full absurdity rule can be derived from the restricted one, for those propositions which do not include quantification over empty sets. By this procedure we can in principle extract simply typed programs as in Minlog.
We say that a sequent A ⊢ B is MR-realised, if there is some r such that MR(A → B, r) is true. A rule is realised if whenever all the sequents above the rule bar are realised, then so is the sequent below the bar. Theorem 1.6. The axioms and rules of the system IP C − ∞ are MR-realised. To strengthen the weak absurdity axiom to the full axiom
where A : SP may be arbitrary, we use the crude type map Cr ′ instead and introduce MR ′ . This is defined recursively as MR apart from the case for the existential quantifier:
Theorem 1.2 and Corollary 1.3 now go through with MR ′ and Cr ′ in place of MR and Cr.
The proof of soundness of the logical rules and axioms is similar as for Theorem 1.6, with the exception for the verification of the absurdity rule, and the left existential rule. This requires a special device. Namely a function which to each P : SP assigns an element, called element(P ), of Cr ′ (P ) is necessary. This function is defined straightforwardly by recursion on P . Some key clauses are
Observe that no such element need to exist when employing the first definition of Cr, e.g. in the case Cr(∃(∅, P )) = (Σx : ∅)Cr(P (x)).
Theorem 1.7. The axioms and rules of the full system IP C ∞ (IP C − ∞ and the full absurdity axiom) are MR ′ -realised.
We mention some useful mathematical axioms that are realisable:
Lemma 1.8. For each propositional function P : N → SP the induction scheme
is both MR-realised and MR ′ -realised.
Lemma 1.9. For any binary propositional function P : A × B → SP the type-theoretic choice principle
is MR-realisable. In case B is inhabited, the principle is MR ′ -realisable as well.
Proof. The non-trivial part is to prove the second statement. Suppose b 0 : B and r : Cr ′ (S) and p : MR ′ (S, r), where S = (∀x : A)(∃y : B) P (x, y). Define an auxiliary operation f (x, w) : (Σy : B)Cr ′ (P (x, y)) where x : A and w : Cr ′ ((∃y : B)P (x, y)), by cases
The realiser k for the implication is now given by
To prove it is a realiser, use ⊥-elimination for the case r(x) = inl(u).
The following result is often useful to verify realisability.
Lemma 1.10. If the Tp-translation of the proposition
is true and P is atomic or ⊥, then the proposition is MR-realised as well as MR ′ -realised.
Proof. The realising function is trivial for such a proposition: (λx 1 ) · · · (λx n )(λr)elt. Theorem 1.2, a special property of modified realisability with truth, is necessary here.
Many stronger "transfer principles" are possible to establish. See [BBS02] for further results and references.
An Example
We test the formalisation and extraction procedure on a simple example, which is due to Berger and Schwichtenberg. The extracted function computes Fibonacci numbers efficiently by "memoization."
A binary predicate G on natural numbers is given. From the axioms
one derives by induction and intuitionistic logic the proposition (P) (∀x)(∃k, ℓ)G(x, k) ∧ G(S(x), ℓ). Thus there is some realiser f so that
The extracted program p (which is fib prog in the Appendix) for computing the Fibonacci sequence is then given by p(x) = f (nc, x).1 where nc (nocontent in the Appendix) is the trivial realiser for Ax1 & Ax2 & Ax3. After a normalisation process one gets the program: The normalised program has been computed using the partial normalisation procedure of Agda on selected subexpressions, and was thus not completely automatic. We also introduced the abbreviations C, h, t, g, e by hand. Some syntactical sugar for lambda expressions and pairs is added.
The formalisation
The formalisation have been carried out in Agda/IAgda (version 2003-08-09) with the aid of the graphical user interface Alfa. The relevant files are available at the URL www.math.uu.se/~palmgren/modif
